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One of the keys to Donald Trump’s unlikely rise to the presidency was 
his reliance on tropes of scapegoating to distinguish himself and his 
policies. Scapegoating, a trope that externalizes blame for one’s own 
failures on another, has long held a central place in Trump’s rhetori-
cal repertoire. But during the 2016 campaign, Trump took the tactic 
to new levels, scapegoating immigrants, Muslims, foreign nations, and 
the political elite as a means to identify national failures and justify his 
candidacy. These rhetorical choices raised the profile of his campaign, 
garnered significant media attention, and distinguished Trump from the 
other Republican contenders. while initially slow to call out scapegoat-
ing, naming Donald Trump a scapegoater has now become ubiquitous 
in the political press. The American Conservative called him the “scape-
goat supreme of our time” (Gornoski, 2016).
Roll Call noted how Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric “cloaked” the 
absence of real policy proposals (Allen, 2016). The Washington Post 
argued his inaugural address established potential “scapegoats for his 
presidency” (Downie, 2017). The Atlantic identified how the president 
“scapegoats unauthorized immigrants for crime” (Beinart, 2017). Noam 
Chomsky (2017) pointed to the “obvious technique” of scapegoating as 
a mechanism for Trump to “maintain control.” Yet others have pointed 
to the commonalities between Trump’s rhetoric and Philippine President 
Duterte, who has scapegoated drug users to incite the police to seek out 
and arrest or kill them (Sanchez-Moreno, 2017), and the “rise of the pol-
itics of scapegoating” around the world, mostly by far-right candidates 
obsessed with immigration, refugees, and the shifting demographics of 
ostensibly “white” states (Blakely, 2017).
while scapegoating is common in political rhetoric, Trump’s enact-
ment of this form, particularly as targeted at immigrants and Muslims, 
entails an underlying racialist narrative as the basis of his campaign for 
the presidency. This scapegoating rhetoric challenged American political 
culture generally and the political press specifically for three reasons. 
First, the rhetoric implied racist themes that resonated with a sizable 
portion of the electorate. Second, it led to absurd policy proposals that 
were either infeasible or outright unconstitutional. Third, as Trump’s 
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fortunes grew and mainstream critiques of his discourse populated in-
ternetworked media, the candidate lashed out by scapegoating the press. 
while it would be unfair to criticize the political press for failing to stop 
Trump’s rise, the aggregate impact of Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric re-
veals a fundamental incapacity of the media to contest overtly racist 
tropes.
This chapter argues that Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric has produced 
a pernicious political culture that enabled his rise to the presidency. To-
ward that end, I first discuss the nature of scapegoating in American 
public culture. Then, by analyzing Trump’s rhetoric scapegoating of 
immigrants and Muslims, I demonstrate the depth and consistency of 
Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric. I argue this rhetoric enabled Trump to 
gain recognition, to cobble together an electoral coalition, to stand in for 
policy, and to rationalize policy failure. I then conduct a limited analysis 
of reporting on Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric, marking how the po-
litical press transitioned from treating Trump as novelty to dangerous. 
Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on the press’s role in reporting on 
and contesting xenophobic rhetoric.
Scapegoating in American Political Life
For Carl Schmitt (2007), politics itself is defined by the “distinction” 
that lies “between friend and enemy” (p. 26). This ontology of the po-
litical isolated the enemy as discursively constituted in relation to the 
construction of the people. Constitutive acts to distinguish between 
friends and enemies emphasize the oppositional qualities in each and, as 
such, clarify both the character of the enemy and the people. As Shapiro 
(1999) has said, nationalist discourse defines the self through acts of 
“negation” (p. 42). The stronger the act of negation – in this situation via 
acts of scapegoating – the stronger the sense of identity becomes. This 
Hegelian thesis inscribes the state in an irrevocable process in which in-
dividuals are compelled to “engender an opposite and create an enemy” 
(Shapiro, 1999, p. 43). The downside of this conception of the political, 
of course, is that as Bruce Lawrence and Aisha Karim (2007) have ob-
served, “violence [may be] constitutive of human nature” (p. 4). In other 
words, constituting national identity via negation brings into sharp relief 
the distinctions between us and them, but also inscribes politics into a 
cycle of violence from which there is no escape.
As a rhetorical device, scapegoating is perhaps one of the most 
powerful and integral to the construction of national identity. Most 
obviously deployed in the build up to war, scapegoating involves iden-
tifying an enemy, separating “us” from “them,” and, in the process, 
commits the nation to war. As Bradley Klein (1988) has argued, the 
entire question of “threat” is ultimately a function of dramatic action 
where those external to a political community are coded in terms of 
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an us/them dichotomy or within an orientalist framework (p. 296). 
This process, what Kenneth Burke (1964) has called the scapegoating 
ritual, generates animosity toward an enemy while cleansing the na-
tion of responsibility or guilt for political violence. while the scape-
goated Other can absorb diverse characterizations, the transference 
of guilt and sin is a one-way movement in which a stable community 
deposits collective sin, guilt, and blame on a “sacrificial vessel” ca-
pable of embodying the evil faulted for the community’s collective 
struggle (Foy, 2012, p. 95).
Part of the rhetorical power conferred by scapegoating is found in 
the ritual’s ability to generate cathartic sentiments. These sentiments 
are rhetorically derived from the realization that another is responsi-
ble for the failings of their communities. In contemporary American 
political life, immigrants are popularly scapegoated for the dearth of 
low-skilled jobs, among other community “maladies” (Cisneros, 2008). 
Burke (1969) termed the purifying component of the process “catharsis 
by scapegoat” and explained it could be achieved via the identification 
and punishment of the scapegoat (p. 406).
The teleological character of the ritual, with its identification of puri-
fication as the ultimate destination, manifests first with a defense of the 
“inborn dignity” of the righteous, the location of a “projection device” for 
depositing “one’s ills … thereby getting purification by dissociation” and 
“symbolic rebirth” for the community in which members are offered “a 
‘positive’ view of life” which they can achieve by “moving forward” in the 
direction implied by the scapegoating ritual (Burke, 2005, pp. 193–194).
Moreover, the purifying feature of the scapegoat ritual is found in 
what Foy (2012) called “a transformation process” experienced by the 
scapegoated entity (p. 95). This transformation accrues not merely by 
the casting out or exclusion of the scapegoated entity, or by dissoci-
ation, but by the ritual of sacrifice. As Burke (1969) put it, the “new 
principle of merger” emerges via the “dialectical opposition to the sac-
rificial offering,” in which, via sacrifice, the community cleanses itself 
of the sins attributed to the scapegoated entity (p. 406). The com-
pletion of the scapegoat ritual depends on contextual and rhetorical 
factors in relation to the construction of the scapegoat and the remedy 
proposed.
Domestically, purification may be achievable via the casting out of 
particular populations or via the mere fact of division that distinguishes 
between one population and another, because, as Tom Douglas (1995) 
pointed out, “death is not the reason for scapegoating – it’s an outcome” 
(pp. 8–9). while not all instances of scapegoating demand violence, 
Burke argued the ritual can only produce the “feeling of relief” that 
accompanies catharsis if the sins of the enemy are cleansed in some ca-
pacity (Burke, 1964, p. 16). For Burke, this pressure for relief compels 
political actors to take the ritual to its logical conclusion.
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The Banality of Scapegoating
A “ubiquitous discursive strategy,” as James Jasinski (2001, p. 507) put 
it, scapegoating is constantly repeated in all aspects of human relations. 
Rene Girard (1979) found the ritual so dominant that he claimed scape-
goating is inextricably linked to and the “source of all rituals and re-
ligions” (p. 302). Burke (1968) took things even further – describing 
scapegoating as ontologically written into language itself and manifest 
in all aspects of human social relations (pp. 19–24). Countless studies 
demonstrate this transformational process, identifying as scapegoated 
communities: Muslims, Immigrants, baseball players, foreign enemies, 
drug dealers, philandering presidents, political parties, and a diverse set 
of public actors across differentially located communities.
while all scapegoated communities or individuals are capable of 
absorbing multiple and sometimes conflicting depictions, they remain 
organized under a master term that restricts significant variation in 
how those communities are classified. The term “drug dealers,” for 
example, is flexible enough to include people of every race, domes-
tic and foreign, but designates a particular character premised on 
the actions of the individuals fitting the term. But, by scapegoating 
“drugs” and “dealers,” public discourse produces “common enemies” 
by “(mis)placing blame” from societal or economic factors to the indi-
vidual users and those who supply illicit intoxicants (Mackey-Kallis & 
Hahn, 1994, pp. 2–3). In the first instance, the user is mortified, a 
process that demands admission of guilt. In the second, what Burke 
called victimage, the dealer is singled out as a unique cause of drug 
abuse. This differential aspect of scapegoating - between mortification 
and victimage – means that even while public advocates blames users 
for drug abuse, the dealer and producer receive unique rhetorical and 
material attention. Most notably, the discourse of the “war on Drugs” 
targets dealer and producer with police and military tactics organized 
by the discursive strategy.
Moreover, the scapegoating process implicates public deliberation by 
propagating mythic elements about a particular group and circulating that 
myth in the press. Press circulation of scapegoats often preserves the sta-
tus quo, either by externalizing responsibility for a public problem or by 
undermining those seeking to address it. Jack Lule (2001), for example, 
has shown how the news scapegoated the Black Panthers as a means for 
“delegitimizing dissent” and sabotaged Huey Newton’s activism in par-
ticular (pp. 62, 64–80). Jeremy engels (2010) has contended scapegoating 
“manufactures consent by manipulating the vitriolic emotions” generated 
by figuring the public as victim of a “name[d] the enemy” (pp. 304, 308). 
emily weiser (2008), too, has noted the emphasis on division and naming 
with her modern readings of Burke’s landmark essay “The Rhetoric of 
Hitler’s Battle” (pp. 61–64).
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These critics have contended “unification by scapegoat” extends the di-
alectical relationship between the division of “us” and “them,” a division 
that Burke (1968) has argued carries a “terministic compulsion” that drives 
individuals to “carry out the implications of one’s terminology” (p. 19). 
Thus, just as the Romans needed to crucify Jesus to achieve the catharsis 
invoked by sacrifice and the Nazis had to commit genocide to complete 
the scapegoating of the Jews, so too do nations act out the scapegoating 
ritual in foreign and domestic policymaking (Burke, 1973, pp. 45–48). In 
this way, scapegoating drives a pseudo-deliberation in which scapegoating 
a political enemy serves as the basis for political consent.
Trump’s Scapegoating Rhetoric
Cobbling together a narrow coalition that barely eked out an electoral 
College victory, Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric propelled his candidacy 
while revealing deeply rooted racism in American political culture, if not 
the Fourth estate (Grusin, 2017, pp. S87–S88). This rhetoric is distinc-
tive in that Trump wove it into arguments for impossible policy plans 
– the southern border wall Mexico would pay for and his pledge to ban 
Muslims from entering the country, shut down mosques, and otherwise 
suppress Islam in the United States. These proposals – one practically un-
feasible, the other likely unconstitutional – comprised the policy core of 
his campaign and reflected Trump’s ignorance and braggadocio.
Atypically, however, Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric produced division 
and opposition rather than unity. The rise of “resistance” groups, his 
declining popularity, and his inability to manufacture consent for viru-
lently racist policies speak to the divisive components of his rhetoric. By 
analyzing Trump’s scapegoating of immigrants and Muslims – his most 
consistent targets – this section highlights the overtly racist components 
of his rhetoric and provides insight into his failure to generate unity.
Scapegoating (Mexican) Immigrants as Criminals
Scapegoating immigrants for American failures retains a central position 
in Trump’s rhetorical arsenal. From his speech announcing his candidacy 
to the present, he has consistently spoken about the dangers posed by im-
migrants, identified immigrants as the source of national problems, and 
blamed Democrats for failing to stop immigrants from illegally entering the 
country. In his presidential announcement address on June 16, 2015, Trump 
laid the foundation for this discourse by focusing on Mexicans by stating:
when Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best… They’re 
sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those 
problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. 
They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. But I speak to 
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border guards and they tell us what we’re getting… They’re sending 
us not the right people. It’s coming from all over South and Latin 
America, and it’s coming probably – probably – from the Middle east.
(Trump, 2016a)
This rhetoric figures immigration as something sent by foreign govern-
ments, implying those governments select their worst citizens and deliver 
them to the U.S. border. In doing so, Trump expands archetypal forms 
of scapegoating from the actual immigrants to include national govern-
ments. while Trump’s scapegoating of immigrants blossomed into a full-
throated charge that Muslims are responsible for international terrorism 
as his campaign progressed, this speech focused attention on “the bor-
der.” Implying immigrants only transit from south to north – thus there 
is only one border that matters – he pledged to build a wall between the 
United States and Mexico that they will “pay for” (Trump, 2016a).
Trump’s scapegoat, distinctly brown and foreign, appeared as the 
source of drug abuse, crime, rape, and terrorism. The rhetoric turned 
a blind eye to America’s collective appetite for illegal drugs and to how 
national policies contribute to the rise of terrorism in the world and in-
stead outsourced responsibility to those most vulnerable. The rambling 
remarks moved from blaming individuals, however, to also scapegoat 
nations like Mexico and China as simultaneously weak and vindictive 
and marvels of technological advancement. Appearing contradictory, 
Trump’s argument implied that America was “losing” because other na-
tions had figured out how to take advantage of us to their own benefit 
(Trump, 2015a).
This rhetoric blamed American economic and social weakness on the 
strategies enacted by foreign presidents. It implied that Mexican leaders, 
in particular, had sought to undermine America’s greatness by flooding 
the country with poorly skilled, criminal elements. Simultaneously, the 
rhetoric called for a strong, capable leader up to the task of returning 
America to its former glory, someone who could out-strategize the oppo-
sition. In short, it heralded the need for a master negotiator, a deal maker.
Perhaps responding to media pushback, Trump doubled down on his 
claims about Mexico, tweeting on June 30, 2015, “I love the Mexican 
people, but Mexico is not our friend. They’re killing us at the border and 
they’re killing us on jobs and trade. FIGHT!” (Trump, 2015b). while 
this rhetoric mimics how presidents refer to foreign enemies  (Flanagan, 
2009), Trump’s identification of Mexico as an enemy was shocking in and 
of itself. The United States and Mexico have long enjoyed close relations. 
During the Cold war, Mexico supported American anti- Communism 
policies in the region. After the Cold war, in addition to Canada, the na-
tions negotiated and acceded to a free trade agreement. President George 
w. Bush’s first international trip was to Mexico. And the nations have an 
ongoing partnership to combat drug trafficking.
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In short, since 1945, Mexico has been one of the United States’ stron-
gest and most reliable allies. Trump’s narrowing of scapegoating to 
specifically identify Mexico as an enemy of the nation disrupted this 
longstanding relationship. In Trump’s world, Mexico appeared as dan-
gerous and hostile to American interests. As he put it at a campaign rally 
in New Hampshire on June 30, 2016, “that could be a Mexican plane 
up there. They’re getting ready to attack” (Gass, 2016). Picked up by the 
press as a jest, Trump’s audience appeared to enjoy the remark and, in 
the broader context of a rhetoric blaming Mexico for stealing American 
jobs, the claim extended Trump’s scapegoating thesis. Mexico, in coop-
eration with the Clintons and NAFTA, orchestrated American malaise.
In one of the strangest twists of the campaign, Trump’s scapegoating 
rhetoric entangled the Pope after the religious leader made comments op-
posing the candidate, his anti-Mexican rhetoric, and his proposed bor-
der wall. Trump’s statement warned that “when the vatican is attacked 
by ISIS … the Pope would have only wished and prayed that Donald 
Trump would have been president” (Trump, 2016e). Raising the other 
primary target of Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric – Muslims – the state-
ment also extended his claims about Mexico. This time, Trump figured 
Mexico as a rude bully having “made many disparaging remarks about 
me.” They also were suspicious and secretive, but Trump was “wise to 
them” and knew they “want[ed] to rip off the United States.”
Indicting all Mexicans, not just the president or the country’s leader-
ship, Trump’s scapegoat appeared as an entire nation, collectively respon-
sible for America’s decline. Their policies cause, Trump stated, “crime, the 
drug trafficking and the negative economic impact” (Trump, 2016e). All 
of these remarks figured Mexico as the responsible party for American 
economic and cultural suffering, depicting the southern neighbor as hav-
ing both the intent and means to ruin the nation. At the same time, they 
figured Trump as the only candidate to truly know the shape of Mexican 
character and as being up to the task of defeating their nefarious designs.
Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric reached an apex in his address ac-
cepting the nomination for president. In this speech he claimed “nearly 
180,000 illegal immigrants with criminal records … are tonight roam-
ing free to threaten peaceful citizens” (Trump, 2016d). He punctuated 
the claim with an anecdote about an innocent (white) child killed by an 
undocumented immigrant (non-white) before shifting to claims about 
immigrants stealing American jobs. Once again, the rhetoric piled the 
blame for national ills on a foreign body. Crime, poverty, crumbling 
infrastructure, and budget deficits all resulted from massive waves of 
illegal immigration. Identifying the immigrant body – coded as a con-
taminant to the national body politic – as the cause of the nation’s prob-
lems also pointed to the solution. Only by empowering Trump to run 
the nation could the immigrant body be banished from the country and 
prevented from returning.
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while Trump’s scapegoating of Mexicans remained consistent across his 
campaign, his vainglorious trip to meet with the president of  Mexico – 
 enrique Peña Nieto – in August 2016, temporarily moderated the explicit-
ness of his rhetoric. He followed up the visit with what he called a “detailed 
policy address” on “illegal immigration” in Phoenix, Arizona, on August 
31, 2016. After praising Peña Nieto as someone “who truly loves his coun-
try,” Trump claimed he would rework the relationship between the two 
nations on the basis of “fairness” (Trump, 2016f). The comment implied, 
of course, that the current relationship was unfair, balanced in favor of 
Mexico. The rest of the address mimicked the basic pattern by pointing out 
the harm caused by immigrants and by blaming President Barack Obama 
and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.
In each instance, the scapegoated Other appeared as “illegal immi-
grants,” rather than Mexico. Trump characterized immigrants as unable 
to “assimilate,” as dangerous and violent, and as job stealers who are 
“hurting a lot of our people that cannot get jobs under any circum-
stances” (Trump, 2016f). This rhetoric justified Trump’s policy propos-
als, most notably his claim that he would build a “beautiful southern 
border wall” that “Mexico will pay for” (Trump, 2016f). By singling 
out the southern border, the rhetoric again inferred the danger posed by 
darker, non-white bodies moving from South to North.
Conferring responsibility on Mexico for not controlling those  bodies – 
thus their responsibility to pay for the wall – Trump escalated the depiction 
by pointing to the technological sophistication necessary to keep immi-
grants out of the national body politic. “we will use the best technology,” 
he claimed, listing off measures to detect and detain migrants from going 
under or above the wall (Trump, 2016f). The rest of his  policy proposals 
related to amplifying the means to capture and banish immigrants from 
the country, which he summed up by saying, “otherwise we don’t have a 
country” (Trump, 2016f). Again, the rhetoric implied the contamination 
of the national body by foreign, non-white Others. Immigrants didn’t just 
represent danger or loss of jobs; they reflected a loss of identity.
Scapegoating Mexicans from the Campaign to the Presidency
In the first presidential debate on September 26, 2016, Trump contin-
ued to identify “illegal immigrants” as the source of rising crime rates. 
Claiming the residents of “our inner cities … are living in hell because 
it’s so dangerous,” Trump blamed “gangs roaming the street. And in 
many cases, they’re illegally here, illegal immigrants. And they have 
guns. And they shoot people” (Trump, 2016a). At the second debate on 
October 9, 2016, he continued the theme, insisting that:
children have been killed, brutally killed by people that came into 
our country illegally. You have thousands of mothers and fathers 
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and relatives all over the country. They’re coming illegally. Drugs 
are pouring in through the border. we have no country if we have 
no border.
(Trump, 2016b)
And in the final debate on October 19, 2016, Trump reiterated all of 
the previous themes about drugs, criminality, loss of jobs, and a loss of 
national identity. emphasizing his differences with Clinton, he finished 
his remarks by declaring that “we have some bad hombres here, and 
we’re going to get them out” (Trump, 2016g). The picture evoked by 
this rhetoric entails a nation with the best intentions, hamstrung by a 
wave of brown, criminal bodies engaged in trafficking drugs, resorting 
to violence to pursue their goals, and unchecked by national authorities. 
Prototypical for racialized depictions of Latino immigrants (Santa Ana, 
2002), Trump’s rhetoric blamed both the immigrant and the Democrats 
for allowing the undocumented to corrupt the national fabric. As a ra-
tionale for his candidacy, this discourse distinguished his outlook from 
Clinton’s while pushing his plan to “build a wall.”
Atypical for presidents, Trump has held several campaign style rallies 
since his inauguration. In those rallies, he has again resorted to scape-
goating immigrants for perceived national problems. In one such rally, 
he repeated his campaign tale of meeting “American families whose 
loved ones – sons and daughters, husbands and wives – were viciously 
killed by illegal immigrants” (Trump, 2017a). Simultaneously empha-
sizing American victimhood while blaming the previous administration 
and “the media” for enabling immigrant violence, Trump’s scapegoat-
ing rhetoric expanded the number of parties responsible beyond just the 
immigrant. It also wielded presidential ethos to fill out a more complete 
picture of the scapegoated other.
Implying his vantage point provided a clearer picture of the problem, 
Trump stated that “we are finding that drug dealers, robbers, thieves, 
gang members, predators, killers and criminals of all types preying on 
our citizens … one by one, they are being tracked down and thrown 
the hell out of our country, and we will not let them back in” (Trump, 
2017a). This rhetoric placed criminality in a binary relation – criminals 
were foreign and illegal, the victim citizens, innocent and law abiding. 
The rhetoric implied immigrants had an animalistic character. They 
“preyed” on the innocent and had to be “tracked down” and evicted 
from the nation. He continued these themes a subsequent rally (Trump, 
2017b), a white House event in which he brought in family members of 
persons killed by undocumented immigrants (Trump, 2017c), a state-
ment on legislation to further criminalize undocumented border cross-
ings (Trump, 2017d), and in a weekly address (Trump, 2017e).
But it wasn’t until a rally held in Ohio on July 25, 2017, that the 
president explicitly called immigrants “animals,” conferring subhuman 
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status upon them (Roberts, 2017). Claiming immigrants were “predator 
and criminal aliens who poison our communities with drugs and prey 
on innocent young people,” he then described how they kidnapped “a 
young, beautiful girl” and tortured her to death “because they want 
them to go through excruciating pain before they die” (Roberts, 2017). 
embodying the most racist form of scapegoating, Trump’s rhetoric dehu-
manized the foreign body, marking it as the source of domestic problems 
and signaling the likelihood that his policies would increasingly target 
the scapegoated population. It also collapsed distinctions between the 
undocumented and the documented, the criminal and the lawful.
Scapegoating Muslims as Terrorists
The scapegoating of Muslims by Trump appeared as a secondary tar-
get during the campaign. Having endorsed some of the worst conspir-
acy theories about Barack Obama’s nationality and religious affiliation, 
Trump had a well-documented public record of expressing concern 
about  Muslims. In his pre-campaign discourse, Muslims were suspi-
cious by their very nature. His campaign rhetoric gradually embraced 
and expanded on the thesis that Muslims are inherently dangerous. At 
a rally in New Hampshire on September 30, 2015, he warned attendees 
that Syrian refugees “could be ISIS… This could be one of the greatest 
tactical ploys of all time. A 200,000-man army, maybe.” Filling out the 
portrait, he asserted, “they’re all men, and they’re all strong-looking 
guys” (Johnson, 2015a).
Simultaneously casting europe and the United States as potential vic-
tims of terrorist attack, the rhetoric depicted refugees as purposefully 
secretive, masculine, and potentially dangerous. Implicitly figuring the 
United States and europe as white states – victims of Middle  easterners – 
Trump’s supposition extended his prior concerns about non-white bodies 
posing a danger to national identity and justified the a priori exclusion 
of refugees.
A month later, Trump implied that the problem was Islam itself, 
not merely Syrian refugees. In an interview with Fox Business, he 
expressed interest in shutting down mosques in the United States as 
something to “look at” (Bailey, 2015). He continued the theme in an 
interview on MSNBC on November 15. This time he was even more 
explicit, stating how closing mosques is “something that you’re going 
to have to strongly consider because some of the ideas and some of the 
hatred – the absolute hatred – is coming from these areas.” He elab-
orated: “The hatred is incredible; it’s embedded. It’s embedded. The 
hatred is beyond belief.” even while noting he knows some “Muslims, 
who are such unbelievably great people,” the valence of his remarks 
left little doubt about the source of American insecurity and how to 
counteract it (Johnson, 2015b).
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The Episodic Scapegoating of Muslims
Throughout the rest of 2015, Trump continued to insist that Muslims 
of all stripes were anti-American, different from the rest of “us” and in 
need of monitoring, if not exclusion. In Alabama, he claimed “thousands 
and thousands of people were cheering” the fall of the world Trade Cen-
ter, and on ABC News he clarified that those cheering were “a heavy 
Arab population” (Delawala, 2015). On MSNBC, Trump stated, “we 
are not loved by many Muslims” (Morning Joe, 2015). each of these iter-
ations distinguished between us – non-Muslim Americans – and them – 
 Muslims of many nationalities – implying that Muslims could never truly 
be part of the nation. The call reached its apex with Trump’s response to 
the San Bernardino massacre on December 13, 2015. “You have to take 
out their families,” Trump declared on Fox News. Later, he claimed “we 
have people out there that want to do great destruction to our country.” 
He ended the year claiming that Islam is a “sickness” and Muslims are 
“sick people” (Friedman, 2015).
By March 2016, the scapegoating of Muslims resurged in Trump’s 
speeches. He contended on CNN that “Islam hates us … there’s unbe-
lievable hatred of us” (Schleifer, 2016). After three suicide bombings 
in Brussels, he expanded on the theme telling Fox Business that “we’re 
having a problem with the Muslims … these attacks aren’t coming out 
of – they’re not done by Swedish people” (Saul, 2016). The phrasing of 
“the Muslims” again distinguished between us and them by separating 
Muslims as a separate class. On NBC’s TODAY, he added “there’s no 
assimilation … they want Sharia Law. They don’t want the laws that we 
have” (Stump, 2016). The rhetoric replicated tropes of the national body 
contaminated by a foreign Other, warning that no Muslim immigrant 
could ever truly become American (or western) because the very nature 
of their religion precluded it.
After the Pulse Nightclub massacre in Orlando, Florida, in June 2016, 
Trump extended his scapegoating of Muslims to renew his call for an 
 immigration ban. Claiming the massacre was an “attack on the right of ev-
ery single American to live in peace and safety,” Trump’s speech sought to 
produce unity via the identification of a common enemy (Trump, 2016c). 
Dodging the nature of the victims – LGBTQ people – Trump identified 
the enemy as Muslim and foreign, never truly “homegrown” and instead 
“imports from overseas.” The rhetoric distinguished between us and them 
while urging unity across “the whole civilized world in the fight against 
Islamic terrorism, just like we did against Communism in the Cold war.” 
Replicating orientalist tropes about Muslims and implying suspicion to-
ward all Muslims, the narrative built a justification for his Muslim ban 
by scapegoating Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and the “dysfunctional 
immigration system” that left the nation vulnerable to attack (Trump, 
2016c). This discourse distinguished Trump from Obama and Bush.
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while both of his predecessors embraced orientalist policies, Obama 
attempted to justify those policies without articulating stereotypical 
tropes about Islam (Goldberg, 2017). And Bush, even in calling for a 
Global war on Terror – a crusade of west versus east – attempted to ar-
ticulate respect for Islam and dissociate the “terrorists” from the wider 
Muslim diaspora (Lee, 2017, 6). For Trump, nuanced distinctions were 
part of the problem.
Trump’s speech accepting the Republican nomination for president 
leaned heavily on the scapegoating of Muslims to justify his candidacy. 
Framing his candidacy as the remedy to “a moment of crisis for our na-
tion,” Trump claimed:
…to make life in America safe, we must also address the growing 
threats we face from outside the country: we are going to defeat the 
barbarians of ISIS, and we’re going to defeat them fast….The dam-
age and devastation that can be inflicted by Islamic radicals has been 
proven over and over.
(Trump, 2016d)
Here, Trump’s rhetoric simultaneously represented the nation as at 
risk and identified the cause of the danger as an external, non-white, 
non-Christian population.
The principle of division manifest in scapegoating discourse – 
 separating Americans from Muslims – marked the boundary that con-
stituted a specific type of American identity. Rather than signify the 
sovereign border between the United States and the world, Trump’s dis-
course marked that boundary as the division between (predominantly) 
white Christians and Muslims. Making “Islam” the dividing line intro-
duced doubt in the Americanness of any American Muslim, a possibility 
he pointed to by naming the events of 9/11, the San Bernardino attack, 
the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, the recruiting center attack in 
Tennessee in 2015, and the Orlando massacre. with the exception of 
9/11, each of the named attacks involved American citizens who also 
claimed to worship Islam.
As the campaign wound down, Trump continued to blame the immi-
gration system for permitting terrorists to infiltrate the national body. 
In a rally on September 19, 2016, Trump claimed that “Islamic terrorist 
attacks … were made possible because our extremely open immigration 
system” (Nuzzi, 2016). Again, Trump’s rhetoric highlights the “Islamic” 
component of the attacks. The move scapegoated Muslims for American 
vulnerability to terrorism while turning a blind eye to other forms of 
domestic terrorism like abortion clinic bombings or mass shootings that 
did not involve “Muslims.”
Doing so facilitated the identification of a problem – immigration – 
that Trump could solve. Redemption, in Trump’s oration, appeared as 
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first endorsing his mandate for the presidency and then as empowering 
him to fix the problems created by Obama and Clinton. For his base, iden-
tifying Muslims, immigrants, and Democrats as the source of American 
ills proved cathartic. A week after his inauguration, Trump signed the 
first executive order barring Syrian refugees and citizens of seven other 
nations from entering the country for 90 days. After a series of court 
challenges, Trump reissued the ban in a way designed to withstand legal 
scrutiny (Liptak, 2017).
Analysis of Media Response to Trump’s Scapegoating 
Rhetoric
The scope of this chapter does not permit a full analysis of the bulk 
of media coverage over the course of the campaign. Instead, the fol-
lowing focuses on three significant moments in the campaign: Trump’s 
announcement address, his response to the Orlando massacre, and his 
address accepting the nomination for president. Analyzing press ac-
counts of these four events provides insight into the shape and tone of 
coverage over the first year of his campaign and points to the ways the 
political press failed to take his campaign seriously. It also highlights en-
during questions about the role of political journalism in political cam-
paigns in challenging candidates.
Announcement Address
In an already crowded field of Republican challengers, the political press 
did not appear to take Trump’s announcement of his candidacy entirely 
seriously. An analysis of press coverage revealed Trump’s announcement 
address generated three primary responses from the political press: com-
ments about the oddness of his speech, comments about his celebrity 
status, and observations about his chances. Commentary about the odd-
ness of Trump’s speech typically described the setting (Trump Tower 
in New York City), the length of the speech, and the rambling form of 
delivery. when discussing the content of the speech, typical accounts 
referred to it as odd, as “dramatic and eccentric,” and filled with “the 
strangest quotes” (Clark, 2015). Politico referred to the speech and to 
Trump’s campaign as “quixotic” and “pugnacious,” but went on to list 
the “ten best lines” from the speech, with the “best” being a quip about 
Mexicans (Lerner, 2015).
The Guardian (2015) also called the speech “eccentric,” noted the ways 
Trump scapegoated Mexicans, and then shifted to discuss the horserace 
component of a crowded field of Republican challengers. The Financial 
Times called his address a “bizarre tirade” and noted the “string of xe-
nophobic comments – particularly about Mexican immigrants whom 
he said included ‘rapists’” (Sevastopulo, 2015). National Public Radio 
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(NPR) classified the speech “unconventional” but produced a list of 
its “best moments” (Kelly, 2015). Notably, the list did not mention the 
“rapists” comment. Matt Tiabbi (2015) wrote a column in Rolling Stone 
listing “the 47 funniest things about Donald Trump” and referred to his 
comments about Mexicans as a “crude swipe.” These examples point to 
the ways the political press covered Trump’s entry into the race as a form 
of comic relief. very few mainstream news sources directly challenged 
Trump’s scapegoating rhetoric, instead noting its atypical form for pres-
idential aspirants.
A secondary strain of commentary highlighted Trump’s celebrity sta-
tus. ABC News recounted the candidate’s descent on the escalator prior 
to his actual address, referring to him as “The Donald” (Santucci & 
Stracqualursi, 2015). CNN emphasized Trump’s celebrity status, not-
ing he “flaunted his wealth and success in business” to prove his qual-
ifications for the job (Diamond, 2015). entertainment press coverage 
raised Trump and his candidacy as a spectacle and as a source of com-
edy (Scheck, 2015). Most accounts discussed Trump’s candidacy as a 
“gift from the comedy gods” (Bauder, 2015). One account mentioned 
Trump had referred to Mexicans as “rapists,” as well as attacking “U.S. 
politicians as ‘stupid,’ ‘morally corrupt’ losers” (Mcaffe, 2015). In none 
of these accounts did the press report on or challenge Trump’s scape-
goating of Mexicans. Instead, each of these accounts highlighted some 
capacity of Trump’s celebrity status and the potential comic relief made 
possible by his candidacy.
The final major strand of commentary focused on Trump’s chances 
to win the nomination. Most discounted the possibility of Trump win-
ning the nomination. The Financial Times, again, claimed that “practi-
cally no one thinks the billionaire has a chance of becoming president,” 
quoting academics and political analysts to demonstrate the consensus 
(Sevastopulo, 2015). One conservative commenter wrote a column titled 
“Anticipating Donald Trump’s exit speech” and called the announce-
ment speech “crazy,” “incoherent,” and a “joke” (Domke, 2015). In 
short, a significant strand of coverage did not take Trump’s candidacy 
seriously.
Responses to Trump’s comments on Orlando Massacre, 
June 2016
The analysis of press coverage of Trump’s speech after the Orlando 
massacre demonstrates the significant shift in coverage from June 2015 
to June 2016. Multiple reports specifically named and challenged his 
scapegoating of Muslims, noting that his rhetoric did not align with 
core American values. The New York Times, for example, emphasized 
Trump’s claim that “all Muslim immigrants posed potential threats to 
America’s security and called for a ban on migrants from any part of 
220 Stephen J. Heidt
the world with ‘a proven history of terrorism’ against the United States 
or its allies” (Martin & Burns, 2016). The reporting went on to explain 
how Trump had implicitly connected terrorism to all Muslims, coding 
Muslim bodies as inherently dangerous and incapable of becoming truly 
American.
Another account noted that Trump blamed “Muslim immigrants” for 
terrorism, even though the Orlando shooter had been born in the United 
States, rather than directly call out the candidate, this article reported 
that Clinton had stressed the need to work with Muslim communities 
rather than “scapegoating” them writ large (Cadei, 2016). Another 
commenter lamented the scapegoating of Muslims after the massacre, 
noting that for “Donald Trump … basically all Muslims” are to blame 
(Gobry, 2016). And U.S. News called Trump’s speech “one of the most 
demagogic anti-immigration speeches by a candidate in modern times” 
(Hemmer, 2016).
An additional line of media commentary emphasized the politicized 
nature of the event and pointed to differences between Clinton and 
Trump, as revealed in their speeches about the Orlando massacre. In 
what would become increasingly common after the conventions, these 
accounts depicted Clinton as a “thoughtful, cautious leader” and Trump 
as someone who “shoots from the hip and trusts his gut” (elliot, 2016). 
These accounts identified scapegoating rhetoric in both candidates 
discourse – guns vs. immigration – but withheld judgment about the 
candidates themselves. Instead, they presented the candidates’ remarks 
as indicative of leadership style, leaving it up to the voter to determine 
which style they preferred. A secondary component of this media cover-
age emphasized that the candidate’s speeches “defied, as usual, political 
convention” (Biermann & Halper, 2016). Much of this reporting ap-
peared in a he said-she said format, in which both candidates’ views were 
presented without much guidance offered to delineate or judge the two.
Responses to Republican National Convention Address, 
July 2016
Previous scholarship indicates that news media coverage of convention 
addresses tends to highlight the positive components of the speakers and 
the vision they offer the world (Benoit et. al., 2007, p. 147). Because 
of the potential “bump” in support media coverage of conventions can 
produce, candidates typically coordinate the speeches at the convention 
to ensure the nominee receives favorable coverage (vigil, 2015, p. 130). 
In the current, digitized media ecosystem, convention addresses are 
now live blogged, immediately dissected, memed and otherwise cut into 
sound bites that political commentators employed by the major televi-
sion and cable networks can easily circulate (Foley, 2012, pp. 613–614).
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while the Tv news has, to some extent, participated in these prac-
tices for decades, the increasingly fragmented media landscape has un-
dermined candidates’ attempts to frame news coverage of convention 
addresses (Scacco & Coe, 2016, p. 2017). That said, several strands of 
media coverage emerged in the aftermath of Trump’s acceptance address. 
One strand emphasized the length of the speech and its significance to 
the Republican Party (Date, 2016). These accounts, while noting Trump 
was never a Republican and only became one to win the nomination, 
highlighted the policy components of Trump’s address and his claim to 
leadership. In doing so, these reports detailed ideological and policy dif-
ferences between Trump and the Republican Party.
The major media frame of Trump’s address, however, emphasized the 
“darkness” of his speech. CNN, for example, noted that “Trump con-
jured a dire picture … of an America sliding deeper into poverty, violence 
and corruption” (Collinson, 2016). without using the words, the report 
identified Trump’s reliance on scapegoating, particularly immigrants. 
Reuters, too, adopted a similar frame, claiming “Trump presented a 
bleak view of America under siege from illegal immigrants, threatened by 
Islamic State militants, hindered by crumbling infrastructure and weak-
ened by unfair trade deals and race-related violence” (Holland, 2016).
Trump’s scapegoating of immigrants for insecurity and economic mal-
aise appeared as the dominant frame in these reports, although some 
outlets opted to fact-check the candidate and point to the lack of “policy 
agendas” designed to address the challenges he identified (Flores, 2016). 
And, in perhaps its most explicit move against Trump, The New York 
Times editorial page referred to the speech as a “campaign of fear,” 
and warned that the candidate “intends to terrify voters into supporting 
him” (editorial Board, 2016).
Conclusion
while it is tempting to write Trump off as an exception to the rule, 
as David Campbell (1998) has said, “the ability to represent things as 
alien, subversive, dirty, and sick has been pivotal to the articulation of 
danger in the American experience” (p. 3). Historically constant, those 
representations have driven the nation to war, underwritten racist poli-
cies at home and abroad, and bonded American culture around notions 
of exceptional ideals. Trump rise to power, then, reflects synchronicity 
with a particular kind of identity politics that typifies American political 
culture.
Principally orchestrated via the discourse of scapegoating, this form 
of politics identifies others as the source of American malaise, offering 
up an image of America as held back by the nefarious designs of oth-
ers. Trump’s embodiment of the most racist scapegoating form, while 
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disconcerting, suggests that politicians can continue to exploit American 
commitments to the belief in their own exceptional qualities.
Trump’s candidacy raises important questions for how the news me-
dia should report on populist leaders who directly challenge American 
democracy. As a profession organized to objectively report both sides, 
Trump’s rise suggests limitations in the role the press can play in coun-
tering dangerous populist impulses. Rather than directly calling out 
Trump, his rhetoric, and his candidacy for underlying xenophobic and 
racist elements, initial accounts treated the Trump campaign as another 
act of political theater.
Moving from frames of novelty to frames of danger, the coverage in-
dexed in this chapter demonstrates that Trump’s rise corresponded with 
press concerns about his rhetoric, his policies, and his anti-democratic 
impulses. Rarely engaging explicit condemnation, the press’s emphasis 
on identifying and condemning Trump’s scapegoating of immigrants 
and Muslims suggests a shift in the coverage of the insurgent presiden-
tial candidate.
Still, Trump’s rise generated significant and sustained opposition. A 
Black Lives Matter founder, for example, responded to Trump’s nomi-
nation address by calling out the candidate’s racist undertones. As she 
put it, “the terrorist on our televisions tonight was Donald Trump,” he 
is “a charlatan who will embolden racists and destroy communities of 
color,” and “white people of conscious must forcefully reject this ha-
tred”  (edwards, 2016).
Defining Trump as a terrorist shifted the focus away from the ele-
ments of political theater and spectacle to emphasize the core essence 
of Trump and his campaign. This reframing shows how oppositional 
voices can wield a new rhetoric of the enemy to political gain, not as 
a technique of persuasion, but rather as an embodied position of op-
position. Ultimately, these forms of embodied oppositions are likely to 
become increasingly important as Trump shows no sign of abandoning 
virulently racist forms of scapegoating.
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